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Abstract—In order to preserve the privacy of the users de-
mands from other users, in this paper we formulate a novel
information theoretic Device-to-Device (D2D) private caching
model by adding a trusted server. In the delivery phase, the
trusted server collects the users demands and sends a query
to each user, who then broadcasts packets according to this
query. Two D2D private caching schemes (uncoded and coded)
are proposed in this paper, which are shown to be order optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet data traffic has grown dramatically in the last
decade because of on-demand video streaming. From the fact
that the users’ demands concentrate on a relatively limited
number of files (e.g., latest films and shows) and that the price
of memory components at the user side are usually negligible
compared to the price of bandwidth, caching becomes an ef-
ficient and promising technique in the future commnunication
systems [1], which leverages the device memory to store data
so that future requests for that data can be served faster.
Coded caching was originally proposed by Maddah-Ali and
Niesen (MAN) for shared-link networks, where a server with
access to a library of N files is connected to K users through
an error-free broadcast link. Each user can store up to M files
at its cache. The MAN caching scheme includes placement
and delivery phases. In the placement phase without knowing
the later demands, letting t = KM/N ∈ [0 : K] represent
the ratio between the size of the aggregate cache memory
of the K users and the library size, each file is divided into(
K
t
)
subfiles, each of which is cached by a different t-subset
of users. In the delivery phase, each user demands one file.
According to the users demands, the server sends
(
K
t+1
)
MAN
multicast messages, each of which is useful to t + 1 users
simultaneously (i.e., the coded caching/multicasting gain is
t+ 1). It was proved in [2] that the worst-case load achieved
by the MAN scheme among all possible demands is optimal
under the constraint of uncoded placement (i.e., each user
directly stores packets from the library files, rather than more
general functions thereof) and N ≥ K. When N ≥ K, the MAN
scheme was also proved in [3] to be generally order optimal
within a factor of 2, while a factor of 4 for N < K in [4]. By
observing that some MAN multicast messages when N < K
are redundant, an improved delivery scheme was proposed
in [5], which was proved to be optimal under the constraint
of uncoded cache placement and order optimal within a factor
of 2, even removing the constraint of uncoded placement.
Coded caching strategy was then extended to Device-to-
Device networks by Ji, Caire, and Molisch (JCM) [6], where
in the delivery phase each user broadcasts packets in function
of its cached content and the users demands, to all other
users. With the MAN cache placement, JCM splits each MAN
multicast message into t+1 equal-length sub-messages, each
of which is cached and thus could be transmitted by one user.
When N ≥ K, the JCM caching scheme is order optimal
within a factor of 4, while when N < K an improved scheme
was proposed in [7] by removing some redundant multicast
messages and proved to be order optimal within a factor of 4.
For the successful decoding of an MAN multicast message
(or a JCM sub-message), users need to know the composition
of this message (i.e., the contained subfiles). As a conse-
quence, users are aware of the demands of other users, which
is problematic in terms of privacy. Shared-link coded caching
with private demands which aims to preserve the privacy of
the users demands from other users, was originally discussed
in [8]. Recently, an information theoretic formulation on this
problem was given in [9], where two coded private caching
schemes were also proposed with general order optimal re-
sults. With a novel strategy referred to as private placement
precoding in the placement, the main idea of the first scheme
is to generate symmetric multicast messages, each of which
contains exactly one subfile from each file. The second scheme
generates NK−K virtual users such that each file is demanded
by K real or virtual users, and then uses the MAN delivery
scheme to serve these NK users. Later the second scheme was
improved in [10] by using the delivery scheme in [5] to serve
the NK users, instead of using the MAN delivery scheme.
By observing that the private caching schemes in [9], [10]
need high subpacketiation levels (i.e., the number of subfiles
into which each file must be partitioned in the placement
phase), the authors in [11] proposed a private caching scheme
for two-user and two-file systems, with the minimal possible
subpacketization level.
In this paper, we consider the problem of coded caching
with private demands for D2D systems. We introduce a novel
D2D architecture with a trusted server which is connected
to each user through an individual link and without access
to the library, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The placement phase
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is the same as the shared-link and D2D caching models
in [6], [12]. In the delivery phase, each user first informs
the trusted server about the index of the demanded file. After
collecting the information about the users demands and the
cached content, the trusted server sends a query to each user,
which then broadcast packets according to this query.1 The
objective is to design a two-phase D2D private caching scheme
with minimum number of transmitted bits by all users in the
delivery phase, while preserving the users demands from the
other users.
The privacy of the users demands was originally considered
as the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem in [13].
In this setting, a user wants to retrieve a desired message
from some distributed non-colluding databases (servers), and
the objective is to prevent any server from retrieving any
information about the user demand. Recently, the authors
in [14] characterized the information-theoretic capacity of the
PIR problem by proposing a novel converse bound and a coded
PIR scheme based on an interference alignment idea. The T -
robust PIR problem with colluding servers were originally
considered in [15], where any T -subset of queries sent from
the user cannot reveal any information about the demand.
Instead of assuming each server can access to the whole
library, the T -robust PIR problem with colluding servers where
each server has a coded storage, was considered in [16], [17].
However, there is only one user and it is without cache.
The proposed D2D private caching model can be separated
into K transmitters and K receivers, where each transmitter
is aware of which packets are transmitted by any other
transmitter. In other words, the transmitters are colluding. In
addition, there are multiple receivers in the system, each of
which has the same cache as one receiver. Hence, the proposed
model cannot be seen as a special case or as an extension of
existing PIR problems.
Contributions: Our main contributions are as follows.
• We formulate an information-theoretic D2D coded
caching model which preserves the privacy of the users
demands from other users.
• By observing that the existing coded private shared-
link caching schemes in [9] cannot be directly extended
to the proposed D2D scenario while maintaining the
privacy (which will be clarified in Section II-B), we
propose a novel D2D coded private caching scheme. The
composition of multicast messages is independent of the
users demands from the viewpoint of each user.
• By comparing the proposed D2D private caching scheme
with the converse bound for the MAN shared-link caching
model in [3], we prove the proposed scheme is order
optimal within a factor of 6 when N ≥ K and M ≥ 2N/K,
and within a factor of 12 when N < K and M ≥ N/K.
1The trusted server acts only as a coordinator to warrant demand privacy,
but does not support any large load of communication. In fact, the demands
and the control commands to tell the users what to send can be seen as
protocol information, requiring a communication load negligible with respect
to the actual file transmission. Hence, the load of the system is still only
supported by D2D communication, while the user-server communication is
only protocol information.
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Fig. 1: The formulated D2D private caching problem with a trusted
sever and K = 3 users.
Paper Organization: The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. Section II formulates the D2D caching model with
private demands. Section III presents our proposed achievable
schemes and the order optimality results. Section IV concludes
the paper.
Notation Convention: Calligraphic symbols denote sets,
bold symbols denote vectors, and sans-serif symbols denote
system parameters. We use | · | to represent the cardinality of
a set or the length of a vector; [a : b] := {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}
and [n] := [1, 2, . . . , n]; ⊕ represents bit-wise XOR; E[·]
represents the expectation value of a random variable; [a]+ :=
max{a, 0}; we let (xy) = 0 if x < 0 or y < 0 or x < y.
We denote by H(·) and I(·; ·) the entropy and the mutual
information as in [18].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELATED RESULTS
A. System Model
A (K,N,M) Device-to-Device (D2D) caching system with
private demands illustrated in Fig. 1 is defined as follows,
by using the notations in [9]. The library contains N inde-
pendent files, denoted by (F1, F2, . . . , FN), where each file is
composed of B i.i.d. bits. As in [12], we assume that B is
sufficiently large such that any sub-packetization of the files
is possible. There are K users in the system, each of which is
equipped with a cache of MB bits. We assume that M ∈ [NK ,N]
such that the aggregate cache in the entire network can cover
the file library. There is a trusted server without access to
the library in the system. This server is connected to each
user through an individual link. In addition, there is also a
broadcast link from each user to other users. We assume a
collision avoidance protocol for which when a user broadcasts,
all the other stay quiet and listen (e.g., this can be implemented
in a practical wireless network using CSMA, as in the IEEE
802.11 standard). In this paper, we consider the non-trivial
case where min{K,N} ≥ 2.2
2 When K = 1 or N = 1, it is obvious that each user knows the demands
of other users.
The caching system operates in two phases.
Placement Phase. During the placement phase, user k ∈ [K]
stores content in its cache of size MB bits without knowledge
of later demand. We denote the content in the cache of user
k ∈ [K] by
Zk = (M (Ck), Ck), (1)
where Ck represents cached content from the N files,
H
(
Ck|F1, . . . , FN ,M (Ck)
)
= 0, (cache constraint) (2)
and M (Ck) represents the metadata/composition of Ck (i.e.,
from which code on which bits, Ck are generated). In other
words, Ck is a deterministic function of the library and
of the metadata describing the cache encoding. Notice that
M (C1), . . . ,M (CK) are random variables over C1, . . . , CK,
representing all types of cache placement which can be used
by K users. In addition, for any k ∈ [K], the realization of
M (Ck) is known by user k and the trusted server, and is not
necessarily known by other users.
We assume that the length ofM (Ck) is negligible compared
to the file length B such that, for simplicity, the relevant cache
size constraint is
H(Zk)
B
=
H(Ck)
B
≤ M, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Memory size). (3)
Delivery Phase. During the delivery phase, each user k ∈
[K] demands file Fdk where dk is a random variable over [N],
and we denote the demand vector of the K users by d =
(d1, . . . , dK). In addition, we define d\{k} for each k ∈ [K] as
the demands of all users except user k, where
d\{k} := (d1, . . . , dk−1, dk+1, . . . , dK). (4)
The delivery phase contains the following three steps.
1) Step 1: each user k ∈ [K] sends the index of its
demanded file (i.e., dk) to the trusted server.
2) Step 2: according to users’ demands and caches, the
trusted server sends the metadata M (Xk) to each user
k, where Xk represents the packets which should be
broadcasted by user k.
3) Step 3: each user k broadcasts Pk = (M (Xk), Xk) of
RkB to other users, is based only on the its local storage
content Zk and the metadata M (Xk). In other words,
we have
H(Xk|M (Xk), Zk) = 0. (Encoding constraint) (5)
H(Pk) = H(Xk) ≤ RkB. (Load constraint) (6)
The constraints on the decoding of the demanded file by
each user while maintaining the privacy is given as follows.
for each user k ∈ [K], it must hold that
H
(
Fdk |(Pj : j ∈ [K]), Zk, dk
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Decodability)
(7)
In other words, given what user k has at its disposal after
the delivery phase, the desired file Fdk is fully determined
(conditional entropy equal to zero). For the privacy, Given
dk, user k cannot get any information about the demands of
other users from (Pj : j ∈ [K]} and Zk. In addition, Zk is
independent of d. Hence, the privacy constraint can be written
as
I
(
d\{k}; (Pj : j ∈ [K])|Zk, dk
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (Privacy)
(8)
In other words, the mutual information between d\{k} and the
user information after the delivery phase, quantifies in precise
information theoretic terms the information leakage of the
delivery phase on the demands of other users in the perspective
of user k. This privacy constraint (zero information leakage)
corresponds to perfect secrecy in an information theoretic
sense (see [19, Chapter 22]).
Objective. We denote the total load transmitted by all users
in the delivery phase by
R :=
∑
k∈[K]
Rk. (9)
Similar to the shared-link private caching problem in [9], it is
obvious that the transmitted loads for different demand vectors
should be the same; otherwise, the transmitted load which can
be counted by each user will reveal information about the
users demands. The memory-load tradeoff (M,R) is said to be
achievable for the memory size M, if there exist a two-phase
D2D private caching scheme as defined above such that all
possible demand vectors can be delivered with load at most R
while the decodability and privacy constraints in (7) and (8) are
satisfied. The objective is to determine, for a fixed M ∈ [NK ,N],
the minimum load R?.
B. Shared-link Private Caching Scheme in [9]
In the following, we first recall in short the shared-link
private caching scheme proposed in [9] for general demand
and memory size regime, whose key strategy in [9] is to
generate NK − K virtual users such that the system contains
NK effective users (i.e., real or virtual users). We then show
the direct extension of scheme to the considered D2D scenario
cannot satisfy the decodability and privacy constraints in (7)
and (8).
Placement Phase. A private precoding was used with the
same sub-packetization of the MAN scheme for NK users.
More precisely, let M = Nt/(NK) = t/K where t ∈ [0 : NK].
Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into
(
NK
t
)
non-
overlapping and equal-length pieces. For each file Fi, by
randomly generating a permutation of
[(
NK
t
)]
, we assign each
piece to one subfile Fi,W , where W ⊆ [NK] and |W| = t,
according to this permutation. Each user k ∈ [K] caches Fi,W
where k ∈ W . The random permutation is unknown by each
user k ∈ [K], and thus from the viewpoint of user k ∈ [K],
each cached subfile of file Fi where i ∈ [N] is equivalent from
the viewpoint of user k, while each uncached subfile of Fi is
also equivalent.
Delivery Phase. When the demand vector of the K real users
is revealed to the server, the demands of the virtual users
are generated such that each file is demanded by exactly K
effective users. For each S ⊆ [NK] where |S| = t + 1, the
server generates an MAN multicast message
WS = ⊕
k∈S
Fdk,S\{k}. (10)
By generating a random permutation of
[(
NK
t+1
)]
, the server
transmits all
(
NK
t+1
)
MAN multicast messages in an order
according to the random permutation, which is unknown by
each user, such that each user does not know the t+1 effective
users for which each MAN multicast message is useful.
As a result, from the viewpoint of each real user k ∈ [K], the
compositions of the received multicast messages are equivalent
for different demand vectors given dk, such that it cannot get
any information about the demands of other real users.
The JCM caching scheme in [6] extends the K-user MAN
caching scheme to the D2D scenario (without privacy con-
straint) by using the MAN cache placement and splitting each
MAN multicast message in the delivery phase into t+1 equal-
length sub-messages, each of which can be transmitted by one
of the t+1 users. It is equivalent to say that the D2D delivery
scheme in [6] divides the D2D system into K shared-link
systems, each of which contains K−1 users. In the kth shared-
link system, user k transmits packets as the server, while the
other K− 1 users receive.
However, it is difficult to use this extension idea to directly
extend the above shared-link private caching to the considered
D2D private scenario.
• Issue 1: the shared-link private caching scheme in [9]
contains NK effective users. If we use the extension idea
in [6], we need to divide the D2D system into NK shared-
link systems, where each of the NK users should be
treated as the server for one shared-link system. However,
we cannot have any virtual transmitter in the system.
• Issue 2: if we use the extension idea in [6], for each
k ∈ [K], in the kth divided shared-link system, there are
NK− 1 users and each file in the library is demanded by
K users except file Fdk is demanded by only K−1 users.
Hence, from the transmitted packets by user k, any other
user can easily know that Fdk is demanded by user k,
which contradicts the privacy constraint in (8).
Hence, in the following section, instead of trying a direct
extension of the shared-link private caching scheme proposed
in [9] to the considered D2D private model, we propose a
novel and non-trivial D2D private caching scheme.
III. D2D CACHING SCHEMES WITH PRIVATE DEMANDS
We first introduce a trivial uncoded private caching scheme,
which lets each user recover the whole library in order to hide
its demanded file.
Theorem 1 (Uncoded Scheme). For the (K,N,M) D2D
caching system with private demands, R? is upper bounded
by3
R? ≤ Ru = K
K− 1(N−M). (11)
In order to improve the above uncoded private caching
scheme, we then propose a coded private caching scheme with
a novel cache placement based on generating (K− 1)(N− 1)
virtual users whose subpacketization is different from the
MAN cache placement, and a novel coded delivery scheme,
the compositions of whose transmitted multicast messages
are equivalent from the viewpoint of each real user. More
precisely, from the novel caching construction, the proposed
D2D private caching scheme divides the D2D scenario into K
independent shared-link caching models, each of which serves
U := (K− 1)N (12)
effective users, such that we can solve Issue 1 of the direct
extension from the shared-link private caching scheme in [9]
(as described in Section II-B). In addition, instead of assigning
one demand to each virtual user in the D2D scenario, we as-
sign one demand to each virtual user for each of the K divided
shared-link models, such that each file is demanded by K− 1
virtual or real users to be served in this shared-link model.
Thus we can solve Issue 2 of the direct extension from the
shared-link private caching scheme in [9]. The achieved load
is given in the following theorem and the detailed description
on the proposed scheme could be found in Section III-B.
Theorem 2 (Coded Scheme). For the (K,N,M) D2D caching
system with private demands, R? is upper bounded by the
lower convex envelope of (M,Ru) = (N/K,N) and the
following memory-load pairs
(M,Rc) =
(
(K− 1)(t− 1) + U
KU
N,
U− t+ 1
t
)
, ∀t ∈ [U+ 1].
(13)
Notice that when t = U + 1 in (13), we have the trivial
corner point (M,Rc) = (N, 0).
By comparing the proposed coded private caching scheme
in Theorem 2 and the converse bound for the shared-link
caching problem without privacy constraint in [3], we have
the following order optimality results (whose detailed proof
could be found in Appendix A).
Theorem 3. For the (K,N,M) D2D caching system with
private demands, the proposed scheme in Theorem 2 is order
optimal within a factor of 6 if N ≥ K and M ≥ 2N/K, and a
factor of 12 if N < K and M ≥ N/K.
3 The memory-load tradeoff in (11) is achieved by memory-sharing between
M = K/N and M = N. When M = K/N, we divide each file Fi where
i ∈ [N] into K non-overlapping and equal-length subfiles, Fi = {Fi,{k} :
k ∈ [K]}. In the placement phase, we let each user k ∈ [K] caches Fi,{k} for
each i ∈ [N]. In the delivery phase, each user k ∈ [K] broadcasts Fi,{k} to
other users for each i ∈ [N]. Hence, the whole library is transmitted through
the network (i.e., Ru = N). When M = N, each user does not need to transmit
anything (i.e., Ru = 0).
A. Example
Before the general description on the proposed scheme in
Theorem 2, we first use the following example to illustrate the
main idea.
Consider the (K,N,M) = (2, 3, 2) D2D caching system
with private demands. From (13) and (12), in this example
we have t = 2 and U = 3.
Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into
K
(
U
t−1
)
= 6 non-overlapping and equal-length pieces, denoted
by Si,1, . . . , Si,6, where each piece has B/6 bits. For user
k1 = 1, we aim to generate the subfiles for the shared-link
model, in which user k1 = 1 broadcast packets and there are
K− 1 = 1 real user (user 2) and (K− 1)(N− 1) = 2 virtual
users (users 3 and 4) to be served. In other words, there are
totally (K−1)(N−1)+K−1 = U effective users to be served,
whose union set is [(K− 1)(N− 1) +K] \ {k1} = [2 : 4]. We
randomly generate a permutation of
[(
U
t−1
)]
= [3], denoted
by pi,k1 = pi,1 = (pi,1[1], pi,1[2], pi,1[3]), independently and
uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. We assume
that pi,1 = (1, 2, 3). For each set W ⊆ [(K−1)(N−1)+K]\
{k1} = [2 : 4] where |W| = t− 1 = 1, we generate a subfile
fk1i,W of Fi which should be cached by users in {k1}∪W∩ [K]
according to pi,1 as follows,
f1i,{2} = Si,pi,1[1] = Si,1, (14a)
f1i,{3} = Si,pi,1[2] = Si,2, (14b)
f1i,{4} = Si,pi,1[3] = Si,3. (14c)
Hence, f1i,{2} is cached by users 1 and 2, while f
1
i,{3} and
f1i,{4} are only cached by user 1. Similarly, for user k2 = 2, we
randomly generate a permutation of
[(
U
t−1
)
+ 1 : 2
(
U
t−1
)]
=
[4 : 6], denoted by pi,k2 = pi,2 = (pi,2[1], pi,2[2], pi,2[3]),
independently and uniformly over the set of all possible
permutations. We assume that pi,2 = (4, 5, 6). For each
set W ⊆ [(K − 1)(N − 1) + K] \ {k2} = {1, 3, 4} where
|W| = t − 1 = 1, we generate a subfile fk2i,W of Fi which
should be cached by users in {k2} ∪ W ∩ [K] according to
pi,2 as follows,
f2i,{1} = Si,pi,2[1] = Si,4, (15a)
f2i,{3} = Si,pi,2[2] = Si,5, (15b)
f2i,{4} = Si,pi,2[3] = Si,6. (15c)
Hence, f2i,{1} is cached by users 1 and 2, while f
2
i,{3} and
f2i,{4} are only cached by user 2.
Recall that Z1 = (M (C1), C1) denotes the cache of user
1. In this example,
C1 = ∪i∈[N]{Si,pi,1[1], Si,pi,1[2], Si,pi,1[3], Si,pi,2[1]}
and M (C1) denotes the indices of the contained bits in C1.4
Similarly, we can obtain Z2 for user 2. Hence, each user
4 For sake of simplicity, in the rest of paper, when we describe our
achievable scheme, we directly provide Ck or Xk for each user k ∈ [K]
without repeating that its metadata.
k ∈ [2] caches 4 pieces of each file, and thus it totally
caches 2 4B6 = 2B bits, satisfying the memory size constraint.
In addition, since the random permutations pi,1 and pi,2 are
unknown to user k, each cached subfile of Fi with the same
superscript is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k, e,g,
f1i,{2}, f
1
i,{3}, and f
1
i,{4} are equivalent from the viewpoint of
user 1. Each uncached subfile of Fi with the same superscript
is also equivalent from the viewpoint of user k, e.g., f2i,{3}
and f2i,{4} are equivalent from the viewpoint of user 1.
In the following, we consider two demand vectors (1, 2)
and (1, 1), which represent all possible non-equivalent demand
configurations.
Delivery Phase for d = (1, 2). We treat the K transmissions
from the K users as K shared-link transmissions.
Let us first consider the 1st shared-link transmission in
which user k1 = 1 broadcast packets. We aim to assign
one demanded file to each virtual user such that each file
in the library is demanded by K − 1 = 1 effective user
in [2 : 4]. More precisely, we first let d12 = d2 = 2,
representing the demanded file by real user 2 in the 1st
shared-link transmission. We also let d13 = 1 and d
1
4 = 3,
representing the demanded files by virtual users 3 and 4 in
the 1st shared-link transmission, respectively. For each set
S ⊆ [(K− 1)(N− 1)+K] \ {k1} = [2 : 4] where |S| = t = 2,
we generate
W k1S = ⊕
j∈S
fk1
d
k1
j ,S\{j}
. (16)
In this example, we have
W 1{2,3} = f
1
2,{3} ⊕ f11,{2}, (17a)
W 1{2,4} = f
1
2,{4} ⊕ f13,{2}, (17b)
W 1{3,4} = f
1
1,{4} ⊕ f13,{3}. (17c)
Finally, we generate one permutation of
[(
U
t
)]
= [3], denoted
by qk1 = q1 = (q1,1, q1,2, q1,3), independently and uniformly
over the set of all possible permutations. By assuming q1 =
(1, 2, 3) which is used to transmit the three multicast messages
in (17c) in an order which is unknown to users, we can hide
the users to whom each multicast message is useful. Hence,
we let Xk1 = X1 = (W
1
{2,3},W
1
{2,4},W
1
{3,4}). The trusted
server transmits M (X1) to user 1, who is then instructed to
broadcast P1 = (M (X1), X1).
We then consider the 2nd shared-link transmission, in which
user k2 = 2 broadcast packets as the server.Similarly, we let
d21 = d1 = 1, d
2
3 = 2, d
2
4 = 3, and generate
W 2{1,3} = f
2
1,{3} ⊕ f22,{1}, (18a)
W 2{1,4} = f
2
1,{4} ⊕ f23,{1}, (18b)
W 2{3,4} = f
2
2,{4} ⊕ f23,{3}. (18c)
By generating a random permutation of [3], denoted
by q2, and assuming q2 = (1, 2, 3), we let
X2 = (W
2
{1,3},W
2
{1,4},W
2
{3,4}). The trusted server transmits
M (X2) to user 2, who is then instructed to broadcast
P2 = (M (X2), X2).
It is easy to checked that from the received packets, each
user k ∈ [2] can recover its demanded file. For the privacy,
we then focus on the demand vector d = (1, 1).
Delivery Phase for d = (1, 1). By the same method as
described above, user 1 is instructed to broadcast P1 =
(M (X1), X1) where X1 = (W 1{2,3},W
1
{3,4},W
1
{2,4})
5 and
W 1{2,3} = f
1
1,{3} ⊕ f12,{2}, (19a)
W 1{3,4} = f
1
2,{4} ⊕ f13,{3}, (19b)
W 1{2,4} = f
1
1,{4} ⊕ f13,{2}. (19c)
User 2 is instructed to broadcast P2 = (M (X2), X2) where
X2 = (W
2
{1,3},W
2
{1,4},W
2
{3,4}) and
W 2{1,3} = f
2
1,{3} ⊕ f22,{1}, (20a)
W 2{1,4} = f
2
1,{4} ⊕ f23,{1}, (20b)
W 2{3,4} = f
2
2,{4} ⊕ f23,{3}. (20c)
Privacy. Let us focus on user 1. For each demand vector,
the delivery scheme is equivalent to two independent shared-
link transmissions, and in the kth shared-link transmission
where k ∈ [2] only the subfiles with superscript k are
transmitted by user k. In other words, no subfile appears in the
two shared-link transmissions simultaneously. Each shared-
link transmission is equivalent to a shared-link private caching
scheme in [9] where each file in the library is demanded
by K − 1 = 1 real or user. By the construction on the
cache placement, each cached subfile of Fi with the same
superscript is equivalent from the viewpoint of each real user,
while each uncached subfile of Fi with the same superscript
is also equivalent from the viewpoint of this user. Hence, the
kth shared-link transmissions for different demand vectors are
equivalent from the viewpoint of each real user. For example,
for user 1, f11,{2} and f
1
1,{3} are equivalent, while f
1
2,{3} and
f12,{2} are equivalent. Hence, f
1
2,{3} ⊕ f11,{2} transmitted for
demand (1, 2) is equivalent to f11,{3} ⊕ f12,{2} transmitted for
demand (1, 1) from the viewpoint of user 1. Similarly, X1
transmitted for demand (1, 2) is equivalent to X1 transmitted
for demand (1, 1) from the viewpoint of user 1. By the same
reasoning, it can be checked that X2’s transmitted for different
demands are also equivalent from the viewpoint of user 1. In
conclusion, user 1 does not know any information about the
demand of user 2 from the transmission.
Similarly, it can be seen that the privacy of the demand of
user 1 is also preserved from user 2. Hence, the proposed D2D
coded private caching scheme is indeed private.
Performance. Each user transmits three binary sums of
subfiles, each of which has B/6 bits. Hence, the achieved
load is 1, while the load achieved by the uncoded scheme in
Theorem 1 is 2 and the JCM caching scheme without privacy
achieves 2/3.
5The order of the multicast messages in X1 is not important because this
order is generated randomly. Here, we assume this order for sake of easy
comparison with the demand vector (1, 2).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We are now ready to generalize the example in Sec-
tion III-A. Recall U = (K− 1)N defined in (12). We focus on
the memory size (K−1)(t−1)+UKU N, where t ∈ [U]. We generate
(K − 1)(N − 1) virtual users, which are labelled as users
K+ 1, . . . , (K− 1)(N− 1) + K.
Placement Phase. Each file Fi where i ∈ [N] is divided into
K
(
U
t−1
)
non-overlapping and equal-length pieces, denoted by
Si,1, . . . , Si,K( Ut−1)
, where each piece has B
K( Ut−1)
bits. For each
user k ∈ [K], we aim to generate the subfiles for the kth shared-
link model, in which user k broadcast packets as the server
and there are K − 1 = 1 real user and (K − 1)(N − 1) = 2
virtual users to be served. In other words, there are totally
(K − 1)(N − 1) + K − 1 = U effective users to be served,
whose union set is [(K − 1)(N − 1) + K] \ {k}. We ran-
domly generate a permutation of
[
(k − 1)( Ut−1)+ 1 : k( Ut−1)],
denoted by pi,k =
(
pi,k[1], . . . , pi,k
[(
U
t−1
)])
, independently
and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. We
sort all setsW ⊆ [(K−1)(N−1)+K]\{k} where |W| = t−1,
in a lexicographic order, denoted by W(1), . . . ,W
((
U
t−1
))
.
For each j ∈
[(
U
t−1
)]
, we generate a subfile
fki,W(j) = Si,pi,k[j], (21)
which is cached by users in {k} ∪W(j) ∩ [K].
After considering all K shared-link models, each real user
k ∈ [K] caches all ( Ut−1) subfiles with superscript k, and(
U−1
t−2
)
subfiles with superscript k′ for each k′ ∈ [K] \ {k}.
Hence, user k totally caches
(
U
t−1
)
+ (K − 1)(U−1t−2) subfiles,
each of which has B
K( Ut−1)
bits, and thus the number of cached
bits is (
U
t−1)+(K−1)(U−1t−2)
K( Ut−1)
B = MB, satisfying the memory size
constraint.
Moreover, for each file i ∈ [N], the random permutations
pi,j where j ∈ [K] are unknown to user k ∈ [K]. Hence, from
the viewpoint of user k, each cached subfile of Fi with the
same superscript is equivalent from the viewpoint of user k,
while each uncached subfile of Fi with the same superscript
is also equivalent.
Delivery Phase. We treat the K transmissions from the K
users as K shared-link transmissions. Let us focus on the kth
shared-link transmission, where k ∈ [K].
We first assign one demanded file to each virtual user such
that each file in the library is demanded by K−1 = 1 effective
user. More precisely, for each real user k′ ∈ [K] \ {k}, let
dkk′ = dk′ . (22)
We then define that
ni,k := |{k′ ∈ [K] \ {k} : dk′ = i}|, ∀i ∈ [N], (23)
representing the number of real users in [K] \ {k} demanding
Fi. One file is assigned to each of the (K− 1)(N− 1) virtual
users as follows. For each file i ∈ [N], we let
dk1+K+(i−1)(K−1)−∑q∈[i−1] nq,k = · · · = dkK+i(K−1)−∑q∈[i] nq,k = i.
(24)
For example, when i = 1, we let
dkK+1 = · · · = dk2K−n1,k−1 = 1;
when i = 2, we let
dk2K−n1,k = · · · = dk3K−n1,k−n2,k−2 = 2.
Hence, by this way, each file is requested by K− 1 effective
users in the user set [(K− 1)(N− 1) + K] \ {k}.
For each set S ⊆ [(K−1)(N−1)+K]\{k} where |S| = t,
the multicast message
W kS = ⊕
j∈S
fkdkj ,S\{j}
is generated as in (16). We sort all
(
(K−1)(N−1)+K−1
t
)
=(
U
t
)
sets as above, in a lexicographic order, denoted by
S(1), . . . ,S
((
U
t
))
. We then generate one random permutation
of
[(
U
t
)]
, denoted by qk =
(
qk,1, . . . , qk,(Ut)
)
, independently
and uniformly over the set of all possible permutations. Finally,
with
Xk =
(
W kS(1), . . . ,W
k
S((Ut))
)
, (25)
the trusted server sends M (Xk) to user k, who is then
instructed to broadcast Pk = (M (Xk), Xk) to other users. As
shown in the Example in Section III-A, since qk is unknown
to each real user, this user cannot know the exact users to
whom each multicast message is useful.
Decodability. We focus on user k ∈ [K]. In the jth transmis-
sion where j ∈ [K]\{k}, user k checks each multicast message
in Xj . If one multicast message contains t−1 cached subfiles
and one uncached subfile, user k knows this message is useful
to it and decodes the uncached subfile. For any uncached
subfile of Fdk (assumed to be f
j
dk,W where {k, j} ∩ W = ∅
and |W| = t − 1), user k can recover it from the multicast
message W jW∪{k}.
Hence, after considering all transmitted packets in the
delivery phase, user k ∈ [K] can recover all requested subfiles
to reconstruct its requested file.
Privacy. We also focus on user k. Intuitively, according to
the proposed cache placement, each subfile is generated for
only one shared-link model which is based on its superscript.
Thus we divide the D2D scenario into K independent shared-
link models, i.e., there is no common subfile for any two shard-
link models. In each shared-link model (assumed to be jth),
each file is demanded by K−1 effective users, regardless of the
demand vector of the real users. In addition, the private cache
placement guarantees that from the viewpoint of user k, each
cached subfile of Fi with superscript j is equivalent, while
each uncached subfile of Fi is also equivalent. Moreover, the
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Fig. 2: (M,R) tradeoff for the (K,N,M) = (5, 10,M) D2D
caching system with private demands.
permutation qj related to the order of the multicast messages
in Xj is unknown to user k, and thus Xj is equivalently
the union set of its contained multicast messages from the
viewpoint of user k. In conclusion, by the symmetric construc-
tion of the proposed scheme, the composition of Xj is totally
equivalent for different demand matrices from the viewpoint of
user k, such that the privacy of the users demands is preserved.
The information-theoretic proof on the privacy can be found
in Appendix C.
Performance. Each user k ∈ [K] broadcasts (Ut) multicast
messages, each of which contains B
K( Ut−1)
bits. Hence, the
achieved load is
K
(
U
t
)
K
(
U
t−1
) = U− t+ 1
t
,
coinciding with (13).
Remark 1. In each independent shared-link transmission,
instead of directly transmitting all the
(
U
t
)
MAN multicast
messages, we can also remove the
(
U−N
t
)
redundant multicast
messages, as did in [5]. By combining the privacy proof in
Appendix C and the one in [10], we can easily prove the
privacy of this improved scheme. The lower convex envelop of
the following corner points is achievable,
(M,Ri)=
(
(K− 1)(t− 1) + U
KU
N,
(
U
t
)− (U−Nt )(
U
t−1
) ),∀t ∈ [U+ 1].
(26)
Finally, we provide numerical evaluations of the proposed
private caching schemes for the (K,N,M) D2D caching sys-
tem with private demands. We compare the baseline D2D
uncoded private caching scheme in Theorem 1 and the coded
caching schemes in Theorem 2 and in Remark 1, with the
converse bound in [3] for the shared-link caching model.
In Fig. 2, we let (K,N) = (5, 10) and in Fig. 3 we let
(K,N) = (10, 5). Both of the figure shows that the proposed
coded caching schemes outperform the uncoded scheme.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel D2D private caching
model with a trusted server, which aims to preserve the privacy
of the users demands. We proposed two D2D private caching
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Fig. 3: (M,R) tradeoff for the (K,N,M) = (10, 5,M) D2D
caching system with private demands.
schemes, which are uncoded and coded, respectively. The
proposed schemes were proved to be order optimal within a
factor of 6 when N ≥ K and M ≥ 2N/K, and within a factor
of 12 when N < K and M ≥ N/K.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Before proving Theorem 3, we introduce the following
lemma, whose proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. The multiplicative gap between the
lower convex envelop of the memory-load tradeoff(
(K−1)(t′−1)+U
KU N,
U−t′+1
t′
)
where t′ ∈ [U], and the lower
convex envelop of the memory-load tradeoff
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
where
t ∈ [2 : K], is at most 3 when M ≥ 2NK .
We then prove the two cases in Theorem 3, where N ≥ K
and N < K, respectively.
A. N ≥ K
Converse. It was proved in [3] that for the shared-link
caching model with N ≥ K, the lower convex envelope of
the corner points
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
, where t ∈ [0 : K], achieved by
the MAN caching scheme in [12] is order optimal within a
factor of 2. In addition, it was proved in [2] that these corner
points are successively convex. Hence, when M ≥ 2N/K, the
lower convex envelop of
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
, where t ∈ [2 : K] is order
optimal within a factor of 2. We will also use this converse in
our model. Hence, for M ∈ [2N/K,N], R? is lower bounded
by the lower convex envelope
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
2(t+1)
)
, where t ∈ [2 : K].
Achievability. From Lemma 1, it can be seen that from the
proposed scheme in Theorem 2, we can achieve the lower
convex envelop of the memory-load tradeoff
(
Nt
K ,
3(K−t)
t+1
)
where t ∈ [2 : K].
As a result, the proposed scheme in Theorem 2 is order
optimal within a factor of 6 when N ≥ K and M ≥ 2NK .
B. N < K
Converse. It was proved in [4] that for the shared-link
caching model with N < K, the lower convex envelope of the
corner points (0,N) and
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
, where t ∈ [K], achieved
by the MAN caching scheme in [12] is order optimal within
a factor of 4.
Since the corner points
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
where t ∈ [K], are
successively convex, the lower convex envelop of the MAN
caching scheme for N < K is as follows. There exists one
t1 ∈ [K], such that the lower convex envelop of the MAN
caching scheme for M ∈ [0,Nt1/K] is the memory-sharing
between (0,N) and
(
Nt1
K ,
K−t1
t1+1
)
, while the lower convex
envelop for M ∈ [Nt1/K,N] is the lower convex envelop of
the successive corner points
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
where t ∈ [t1 : K]. In
addition, it is obvious that t1 is the maximum value among
x ∈ [K] such that the memory-sharing between (0,N) and(
Nx
K ,
K−x
x+1
)
at the memory M′ = N(x−1)K leads to a lower
load than K−x+1x . More precisely, if we interpolate (0,N)
and
(
Nx
K ,
K−x
x+1
)
where x ∈ [K] to match M′ = N(x−1)K , the
achieved load is
−N−
K−x
x+1
Nx
K
N(x− 1)
K
+ N =
(K− x)(x− 1)
x(x+ 1)
+
N
x
.
Hence, we have
t1 := arg max
x∈[K]
{
(K− x)(x− 1)
x(x+ 1)
+
N
x
≤ K− x+ 1
x
}
=
⌊
2K− N+ 1
N+ 1
⌋
. (27)
We then interpolate (0,N) and
(
Nt1
K ,
K−t1
t1+1
)
to match M1 =
N/K, to get the memory-load tradeoff
(M1,R1) =
(
N
K
,N− N−
K−t1
t1+1
t1
)
. (28)
Hence, it is equivalent to say the lower convex envelop of the
achieved memory-load tradeoffs by the MAN caching scheme
for M ≥ N/K also has two regimes.
1) M ∈ [NK , Nt1K ]. The lower convex envelop is the memory-
sharing between (M1,R1) and
(
Nt1
K ,
K−t1
t1+1
)
.
2) M ∈ [Nt1K ,N]. The lower convex envelop of the MAN
scheme is the lower convex envelop of the corner points(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
, where t ∈ [t1 : K].
Since the MAN scheme is order optimal within a factor of
4, R? is lower bounded by the lower convex envelope of the
corner points
(
M1,
R1
4
)
and
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
4(t+1)
)
, where t ∈ [t1 : K].
Achievability. Let us first focus on M = N/K. The achieved
load by the proposed scheme in Theorem 2 is N. In the
following, we will prove N ≤ 2R1. More precisely,
N− 2R1 = 2
N− K−t1t1+1
t1
− N
=
2N(t1 + 1)− 2(K− t1)− Nt1(t1 + 1)
t1(t1 + 1)
=
−Nt21 + (N+ 2)t1 − 2(K− N)
t1(t1 + 1)
=
−t1(Nt1 − N− 2)− 2(K− N)
t1(t1 + 1)
=
−(Nt1 − N− 2)− 2(K−N)t1
(t1 + 1)
. (29)
We consider the following two cases.
1) t1 = 1. From (29), we have
N− 2R1 = 2− 2(K− N)
2
≤ 0, (30)
which follows K > N.
2) t1 > 1. From (29), we have
N− 2R1 ≤
−(2N− N− 2)− 2(K−N)t1
(t1 + 1)
< 0, (31)
which follows N ≥ 2 and K > N.
Hence, from the proposed scheme in Theorem 2, we can
achieve (M1, 2R1). In addition, from Lemma 1, it can be
seen that from the proposed scheme in Theorem 2, we can
achieve the lower convex envelop of the memory-load tradeoff(
Nt
K ,
3(K−t)
t+1
)
where t ∈ [t1 : K].
As a result, the proposed scheme in Theorem 2 is order
optimal within a factor of 12 when N < K.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
It was proved in [2] that the corner points
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
where
t ∈ [0 : K] are successively convex, i.e., for each memory size
M ∈
[
Nt
K ,
N(t+1)
K
]
, the lower convex envelop is obtained by
memory-sharing between
(
Nt
K ,
K−t
t+1
)
and
(
N(t+1)
K ,
K−t−1
t+2
)
.
Hence, in order to prove Lemma 1, in the following we
prove from
(
(K−1)(t′−1)+U
KU N,
U−t′+1
t′
)
where t′ ∈ [U], we
can achieve
(
Nt
K , 3
K−t
(t+1)
)
for each t ∈ [2 : K].
We now focus on one t ∈ [2 : K]. We consider the following
two cases.
• U(t−1)K−1 is an integer. We let t
′ = U(t−1)K−1 +1 such that the
memory size is
(K− 1)(t′ − 1) + U
KU
N =
(K− 1)U(t−1)K−1 + U
KU
N =
Nt
K
.
(32)
The achieved load is
U− t′ + 1
t′
=
U− U(t−1)K−1
U(t−1)
K−1 + 1
=
U(K− 1)− U(t− 1)
U(t− 1) + (K− 1)
=
K− t
t− 1 + K−1N
≤ K− t
t− 1
≤ 3K− t
t+ 1
, (33)
where (33) comes from t ≥ 2.
• U(t−1)K−1 is not an integer. We let a =
⌊
U(t−1)
K−1
⌋
and
b =
⌈
U(t−1)
K−1
⌉
. By memory-sharing between (M′1,R
′
1) =(
(K−1)a+U
KU N,
U−a
a+1
)
and (M′2,R
′
2) =
(
(K−1)b+U
KU N,
U−b
b+1
)
with coefficient α =
b− U(t−1)K−1
b−a , we get
M′3 = αM
′
1 + (1− α)M′2
=
b− U(t−1)K−1
b− a
(K− 1)a+ U
KU
N
+
U(t−1)
K−1 − a
b− a
(K− 1)b+ U
KU
N
=
(
b− U(t−1)K−1
b− a a+
U(t−1)
K−1 − a
b− a b
)
(K− 1)N
KU
+
(
b− U(t−1)K−1
b− a +
U(t−1)
K−1 − a
b− a
)
UN
KU
=
N(t− 1)
K
+
N
K
=
Nt
K
.
R′3 = α
U− a
a+ 1
+ (1− α)U− b
b+ 1
=
b− U(t−1)K−1
b− a
U− a
a+ 1
+
U(t−1)
K−1 − a
b− a
U− b
b+ 1
≤ 1
a+ 1
(
b− U(t−1)K−1
b− a (U− a) +
U(t−1)
K−1 − a
b− a (U− b)
)
=
1
a+ 1
U(K− t)
K− 1
≤ U(K− t)
U(t−1)
K−1 (K− 1)
(34)
=
K− t
t− 1
≤ 3K− t
t+ 1
, (35)
where (34) comes from a+ 1 =
⌊
U(t−1)
K−1
⌋
+ 1 ≥ U(t−1)K−1
and (35) comes from t ≥ 2.
Hence, we prove the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE PRIVACY FOR THE PROPOSED CACHING
SCHEME IN THEOREM 2
For the proposed scheme in Theorem 2, we want to prove
the privacy constraint in (8),
I
(
d\{k}; (Xj : j ∈ [K])|Zk, dk
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (36)
We now focus on one user k with the demand dk, and one
cache realization zk. Assume (xj : j ∈ [K]) is a possible
realization of (Xj : j ∈ [K]), given dk and zk. We want to
prove for any demand vector d\{k}, the probability
Pr{(Xj : j ∈ [K]) = (xj : j ∈ [K])|dk, zk,d\{k}}
does not depend on d\{k}.
We have
Pr{(Xj : j ∈ [K]) = (xj : j ∈ [K])|dk, zk,d\{k}}
=
∏
j∈[K]
Pr{Xj = xj |dk, zk,d\{k}, (Xj′ : j′ ∈ [j − 1]) =
(xj′ : j
′ ∈ [j − 1])}. (37)
Recall that the subfiles with superscript j could only appear in
Xj , and that given d, the demands of the virtual users for each
shared-link model are fixed. Hence, we have the following
Markov chain
Xj −→ (d, zk) −→ (Xj′ : j′ ∈ [j − 1]). (38)
Hence, from (37) and (38), we have
Pr{(Xj : j ∈ [K]) = (xj : j ∈ [K])|dk, zk,d\{k}}
=
∏
j∈[K]
Pr{Xj = xj |dk, zk,d\{k}}. (39)
In (39), we consider two cases.
1) j 6= k. Xj is equivalent to the share-link private delivery
in [9] where there are K−1 real user and user k is among
them. Hence, by the proof in [9, Appendix F], Pr{Xj =
xj |dk, zk,d\{k}} = Pr{Xj = xj |dk, zk,d\{k}} is
independent of d\{k}.
2) j = k. All subfiles with superscript k of file Fi where
i ∈ [N] are equivalent given zk, while all transmitted
subfiles in Xj are with superscript k and cached by user
k. Hence, it is obvious to see that the probability of the
union set of multicast messages in Xk is independent of
d.
As a result, we prove Pr{(Xj : j ∈ [K]) = (xj : j ∈
[K])|dk, zk,d\{k}} does not depend on d\{k}, and thus prove
the privacy constraint in (8).
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